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TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD: IF 
EVERYTHING HAS CHANGED, SO MUST WE 
DAVID A. HARRIS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on our country on September 11, 
2001, we quickly became accustomed to hearing that the terrifying events of 
that day “changed everything.”  This phrase was repeated so often that it 
quickly took on the aura of a sacred cliché—something every public figure, 
every news anchor, and every journalist said constantly, and something that no 
one dared challenge.  Looking back on that period from the vantage point of 
several years later, we can see that in some ways this assessment was 
overblown.  Clearly, not everything had changed.  Our country still had its own 
internal issues to deal with: education, taxes, and campaign finance reform, to 
name just a few.  And, except for a regrettably short period of bipartisan unity 
in the wake of the attacks, our ideological and political divisions have 
remained as strong as they have ever been. 
Nevertheless, for lawyers, and especially for teachers in law schools, some 
very important things have indeed changed.  Those of us who make our livings 
parsing legal texts and publishing our solutions to legal problems in law 
reviews and the mainstream press know that when a society experiences great 
stress, the law comes under great pressure—especially in the areas of law that 
involve confrontations between government power and the individual.  In such 
times, the Constitution and the criminal law are always severely tested.  
Surveying the first thirty months after the events of September 2001, that is 
exactly what we see.  Grand, macro-scale questions have come into focus.  For 
example, when, if ever, is it possible or proper for the United States 
government to hold a U.S. citizen in custody without laying any charges, 
without access to counsel, without trial—indeed, without any of the safeguards 
that we have come to associate with the rights of the accused who are in the 
custody of the state?1  In what circumstances may the U.S. government hold 
 
* Eugene Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh’g and reh’g en banc 
denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), and cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-
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persons in custody, but refuse to release any information identifying them?2  
Thus, teachers of both Constitutional Law and Criminal Law must ask an 
important question: How should they change what they teach in light of these 
new realities? 
With regard to Constitutional Law, the answers fairly jump out.  If the 
Supreme Court decides that an American citizen can be detained as an “enemy 
combatant” when he has been captured on the battlefield, and then held 
without any of the rights we associate with government custody of the accused, 
the constitutional issues are both clear and substantial.  They involve the 
separation of powers, the extent of the President’s power as head of the 
Executive Branch and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the 
proper limitations on the role of the judiciary in such a situation.  These issues 
and the questions they present would not, by any stretch, be easy to resolve, 
but the constitutional categories they fall into, and the issues that they affect, 
would be fairly obvious. 
The issues would also be easy to spot in the area of law we call criminal 
procedure.  Indeed, some law schools refer to the course on this area of law as 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure.  The material and the issues in this course 
concern the constitutional regulation of law enforcement: when police may 
stop, search, and seize an individual (governed by the Fourth Amendment); 
when the police may question someone (governed by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments); and when an individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel 
(governed by the Sixth Amendment).  In short, criminal procedure is 
constitutional law. 
Yet in the area of substantive criminal law, the issues are not so 
immediately clear.  We know that, in the very recent past, when terrorists have 
struck, they have been apprehended under the criminal law in United States 
courts.3  Thus, the criminal law has been our primary tool in asserting the 
values of our society and protecting our citizens against the likes of Timothy 
McVeigh, who destroyed the federal building in Oklahoma City in a terrorist 
bombing, and Sheik Abdel Rahman and his followers, the terrorists who 
carried out the first attack against the World Trade Center in New York City in 
1993.  How, then, should the teacher of Criminal Law approach this important 
subject in the post-9/11 world? 
 
6696); see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 1168 
(U.S. Jan. 23, 2004) (No. 03-1027). 
 2. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 124 S.Ct. 1041 (Jan. 12, 2004) (No. 03-472). 
 3. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (defendants charged with 
conspiracy to, among other things, bomb the World Trade Center); U.S. v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271 
(2d Cir. 2001) (appeals of convictions and sentencing surrounding the February 1993 bombing of 
the World Trade Center in New York City). 
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For me, the answer has been both simple and complex, daunting and 
inviting: include the post-9/11 realities in teaching Criminal Law any way you 
can.  No, it does not always fit the material neatly; the issues aren’t as obvious 
as in the Criminal Procedure course.  But, like it or not, our students will begin 
practice in a legal world fundamentally changed by what happened on 
September 11, 2001, and I believe it is our obligation to bring this home to 
them at every possible juncture that makes sense.  They need to see that the 
changes that are happening in real time in the society and the legal culture all 
around them will have an enormous impact on the way that many of them will 
practice law and the way that all Americans understand what law is.  They 
simply cannot leave law school with the belief that these changes have nothing 
to do with them—that if they are not immigrants or Arabs or Middle Easterners 
or Muslims, they need not be concerned.  To allow them to leave our 
classrooms thinking this way would do them an enormous disservice.  On the 
contrary, it is the duty of the legal profession to attempt to mediate the tensions 
that have arisen in our society since 9/11.  Finding the balance we must seek 
between the safety of citizens and the protection of the defendant and the 
countermajoritarian values in the Bill of Rights is never easy, not even in the 
safest of times.  It is made much less so by the existence of a real and 
dangerous threat: the undeterrable terrorist, whose desire to kill us is greater 
than his own desire to live.  It is a challenge unlike any other we have faced.  
But, if we are to preserve what is best about our country and our society, we 
must make sure that we as citizens and as lawyers have a keen sense of what is 
at stake and teach this to our students so that they can understand and embrace 
the core values of our profession in everything they do. 
Some will say that there is a danger that one can go too far in this 
direction—that a law school instructor might talk about post-9/11 
developments in criminal law simply for the sake of talking about them.  
Surely, this is possible, but I believe the risks are actually rather low as long as 
one is reasonably selective.  First, there is little doubt that, along with 
immigration law, criminal law is indeed proving to be one of the major 
weapons in the government’s arsenal as it attempts to fight terrorists.  In other 
words, there is no need to make up the connection between the war on terror 
and criminal law.  It is real, and examples abound.  The important thing is to 
select examples carefully, so that the connections to particular issues under 
study are clear enough for students to see.  Second, one can argue persuasively 
that the danger of overemphasis simply does not exist.  For any lawyer whose 
practice sometimes involves any kind of public law (as opposed to matters 
strictly between private parties), the war on terror and its effects on our legal 
system will be a fact of life for many years to come.  Witness the many 
changes that have already taken place in the legal system in the first two years 
after 9/11.  The war on terror is likely to be the single largest influence in the 
development of public law in the United States over the next forty to fifty 
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years—that is, over the course of the entire career of law students who 
graduate in the next ten years.  Thus, it seems that the benefits of covering 
some of this material in Criminal Law far outweigh the risks involved. 
Of course, it is possible to cover these issues more directly than by just 
raising them occasionally in Criminal Law.  For example, for some years I 
have taught Advanced Criminal Procedure.  I run the course on two parallel 
tracks.  The first track consists of an in-depth study of many of the issues that 
we only touch on in the basic Criminal Procedure course.  We do this by 
reading cutting-edge theoretical and empirical work.  For example, in the basic 
Criminal Procedure course, our discussions often include some speculation 
concerning the actual deterrence value of the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule.  In Advanced Criminal Procedure, we read the empirical 
studies and explorations of alternatives.  What evidence is there that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule actually deters police misconduct?4  What other 
rules might we design that might work better to accomplish this purpose?  
Would we actually be better off without the Miranda rules, as some contend?5  
Should we videotape all statements suspects make to the police instead of 
administering Miranda warnings,6 or should we videotape statements in 
addition to using the Miranda rules?7  Or, should we bar police interrogation 
altogether and leave the questioning of suspects to judges?8  The second track 
of the course parallels the first by allowing students to apply this knowledge 
practically and build their forensic skills by briefing and arguing two different 
criminal procedure problems that incorporate the issues we have studied.  This 
gives students a chance to become better oral advocates and writers, as they 
bring their new knowledge of the subject matter to bear. 
As I prepared to teach Advanced Criminal Procedure in the fall of 2002, I 
was struck by the fact that the issues at the forefront of the field of criminal 
procedure no longer concerned the exclusionary rule or the Miranda warnings.  
These issues were clearly still important, but everyone I knew with strong 
interests in criminal procedure was now talking about other things, such as the 
USA Patriot Act, the possible use of military tribunals, the strengthening of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, and the detention of large 
numbers of people without identifying them, to name just a few.  Thinking 
 
 4. E.g., Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About 
the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983). 
 5. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. 
REV. 387, 486-97 (1996). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly 
Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 556-60 (1996). 
 8. Donald A. Dripps, Supreme Court Review—Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—
And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988). 
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about this, I decided to make a wholesale change in what Advanced Criminal 
Procedure would cover.  I preserved the two-track structure of the course, but 
replaced all of the material focusing on Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
with the basic texts of the war on terror.  For example, students would read, 
among many other items, the USA Patriot Act,9 the presidential10 and 
Department of Defense11 orders on military tribunals, and the memorandum of 
the Deputy Attorney General ordering the “voluntary” questioning of 5,000 
young Middle Eastern men in late 2001 and early 2002.12  The forensic track of 
the course was changed, too: students did briefs and arguments challenging 
and defending particular sections of the USA Patriot Act. 
The students were enthusiastic about the changes.  In post-course 
evaluations, they praised the opportunity to study items that were both relevant 
to their educations and constantly in the news, and they were very happy to 
have the chance to sharpen their forensic skills on the most important anti-
terror statute passed thus far.  Indeed, the one negative aspect of the experience 
was borne primarily by me.  With a course so attuned to current legal events, 
the issues could sometimes become a moving target.  Issues that seemed likely 
to be important before the beginning of the course, at the time that I put the 
course materials together for the students, would sometimes recede in 
importance by the time the course was under way.  For example, in preparing 
to teach the course in the fall of 2003, I included in the materials draft 
legislation then popularly known as “Patriot Act II.”13  This bill was meant to 
strengthen the USA Patriot Act and broaden its reach.  By the time the class 
reached the point in the course in which this material would have been 
appropriate, it had become fairly clear that the proposal was dead; the Bush 
Administration did not even try to introduce it in Congress.  A second example 
of the “moving target” phenomenon concerned material I had to add midway 
through the course during the fall of 2003—the designation of U.S. citizens as 
 
 9. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272. 
 10. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 11. See Fact Sheet: Department of Defense Order on Military Commissions (Mar. 21, 2002), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321fact.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 
2004). 
 12. See Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for All United States Attorneys All 
Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
ag/readingroom/terrorism1.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). 
 13. See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (Draft) (Jan. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.poptel.org.uk/statewatch/news/2003/feb/patriot2draft.html (last visited Sept. 27, 
2004). 
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enemy combatants and the several decisions that had then been made by courts 
on the issue.14 
But if it is easy to see how to work material on the war against terror into 
courses concerning criminal procedure, this leads us back to the initial 
question: How should one attempt to teach post-9/11 legal developments in a 
first-year Criminal Law course?  I offer the following example to explain how 
I attempted it. 
II.  THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES: UNITED STATES V. SATTAR15 
When I teach Criminal Law, I include a short section early in the course on 
the elements of crimes for several reasons.  First, I do this because Criminal 
Law is taught as a required first-year course at my institution.  The practical 
effect of this is that I use Criminal Law to teach many legal concepts that are 
basic to the students’ entire legal education.  Second, I can use the material on 
elements of crimes generally to teach briefly about certain crimes that bar 
examiners seem interested in testing, when those crimes, standing alone, are 
simply not interesting enough to justify spending even a small section of the 
course discussing.  When my students see these offenses in the course of the 
bar preparation study or the examination itself, it will not be the first time.  
Third and most importantly, certainly for those who may one day practice 
criminal law, students simply must understand that the job of the lawyer is to 
prove (or cast doubt upon) various facts in contention.  Most probably do, but 
we err as teachers in assuming that this sinks in automatically for every 
student.  It pays to help students start the course with an almost mechanical 
understanding that lawyers who work as prosecutors must prove the elements 
of the offenses charged.  To address all three of these concerns, I give the 
students a short primer of my own on the elements of crimes—what they are, 
constitutional requirements, and the like—and then a number of typical statutes 
that they might encounter, followed by a problem set.  Each problem spells out 
a hypothetical factual scenario.  Students are instructed to set out the elements 
that must be proven for each crime, and then asked to supply a short answer 
explaining which of the defendants might be guilty of one or more of the 
particular crimes laid out in the statutes. 
For the Spring 2004 Criminal Law class, I followed these materials by 
assigning part of a case called United States v. Sattar.16  This case was still in 
the throes of pretrial litigation when I assigned it.  It concerned a group of 
 
 14. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 
337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 981 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696); see 
also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 1168 (U.S. Jan. 
23, 2004) (No. 03-1027). 
 15. 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 16. Id. 
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defendants accused of providing help to a foreign terrorist organization.  This 
opinion, ruling on several of the pretrial motions in the case, contained a 
section in which these very serious charges raised an argument in which a 
careful analysis of the elements of the crime was absolutely crucial.  The case 
thus appeared to be a perfect opportunity to tie the lessons of street-level 
criminal law to the war on terror.  This is how I taught the case to the class. 
We began the discussion with a basic exploration of the facts of the case 
and the arguments made in it.  One of the defendants in the Sattar case,  Lynne 
Stewart, is a well-known criminal defense attorney in New York City.  In 
1995, Stewart took on the defense of Sheikh Abdel Rahman.17  Rahman was 
one of the principal leaders of the Islamic Group, also known as Gama’a al-
Islamiyya or Islamic Gama’at (IG).18  IG, which has been designated a foreign 
terrorist organization by the Secretary of State,19 has had a presence in the U.S. 
since the early 1990s.20  In 1995, Stewart defended Sheikh Rahman on charges 
that he was part of a conspiracy to conduct terrorism on American soil, 
including the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and a plot to bomb a 
number of other New York City landmarks.21  Stewart continued to represent 
Sheikh Rahman throughout his trial, conviction, and sentencing to life in 
prison plus sixty-five years, and she continued to meet with him in prison after 
he was sentenced.22  Among the allegations against Stewart in the Sattar caseis 
that in the course of those meetings, Stewart helped to allow Sheikh Rahman to 
communicate with his followers outside the prison by distracting guards while 
Rahman both received and sent communications to his followers through one 
Yousry—a man that Stewart brought to the prison as an Arabic translator.23  
Translator Yousry allegedly passed messages to, and received responses to 
these messages from, Sheikh Rahman during prison meetings, all in Arabic.  
Stewart helped “cover” for the Sheikh and the translator by speaking in 
English to distract the guards.  Stewart is also alleged to have passed a message 
to the Sheikh’s followers herself when she announced one of the Sheikh’s 
positions to the media at a news conference.24  These actions resulted in the 
first two counts in the indictment: providing material support to a foreign 
 
 17. Id. at 354. 
 18. Id. at 353. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
 21. Id. at 354. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 354-55. 
 24. Id. at 355. 
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terrorist organization, under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, in the form of 
“communications equipment” and “personnel.”25 
Attorney Stewart and her co-defendant Sattar moved to dismiss Counts I 
and II as “unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”26  In essence, they argued 
that the charges that they “provided material support” in the form of 
“communications equipment” and “personnel” were too indefinite to provide 
ordinary persons with an understanding of what conduct the law prohibits or to 
provide sufficient prosecutorial standards to protect against arbitrary and 
discriminatory law enforcement.27  The indictment alleged that Stewart and 
Sattar and others “provided communications equipment and other physical 
assets, including telephones, computers and telefax machines . . . to IG”28 by 
acting, essentially as a “communications pipeline” between Sheikh Abdel 
Rahman and the outside world.29  For example, the indictment alleged that for 
purposes of the uses of communications equipment, Sattar had telephone 
conversations with IG leaders in which he passed on to them Sheikh Abdel 
Rahman’s instructions, and Stewart released one of Sheikh Abdel Rahman’s 
statements to the press.30  As far as providing material support in the form of 
“personnel,” the indictment alleged that Sattar, Stewart, and others “provided 
personnel, including themselves, to IG, in order to assist IG leaders and 
members in the United States and elsewhere around the world, in 
communicating with each other . . . .”31  In other words, Stewart and Sattar 
were themselves the personnel they provided to IG. In order to examine the 
argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, the court 
moved directly to a consideration of the elements of the crime alleged.  The 
opinion quoted the pertinent part of the “material support” statute, which said 
that “[w]hoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be [guilty].”32  
The statute defines “material support or resources” as “currency or other 
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other 
 
 25. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 354-55.  The other charges in the indictment are not relevant 
to the discussion of the elements of the crime, and I do not have students read any other sections 
in these cases. 
 26. Id. at 355. 
 27. Id. at 356-57. 
 28. Id. at 356. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 356-57. 
 31. Id. at 357 (emphasis supplied). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000). 
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physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.”33  Therefore, the court 
said, “Section 2339B . . . requires only that a person ‘knowingly’ ‘provides’ 
‘material support or resources’ to a ‘foreign terrorist organization.’”34  Stewart 
and her co-defendant Sattar argued that the indictment charged them “with 
merely talking . . . [and] using communications equipment rather than 
providing such equipment to IG.”35 
When the class discussion had progressed to this point, I could see that the 
students understood that unlocking the case had to involve examining the 
elements of the crime, followed by performing the same task that any attorney 
would when confronted with criminal charges: seek definitions of the key 
statutory terms.  In Sattar, the students saw that this was exactly what had 
happened.  Defendants Stewart and Sattar pointed out to the court that the 
legislative history produced by the relevant congressional committee in the 
course of enacting the “material support” statute indicated that, in fact, 
Congress did not intend to criminalize the mere use of communications 
equipment; rather, it only criminalized the actual giving of communications 
equipment to a foreign terrorist organization like IG.36  Stewart and Sattar thus 
argued that simply making phone calls, or talking or communicating one’s 
thoughts, did not fall within the statute.  The court agreed, holding that 
“criminalizing the mere use of phones and other means of communication . . . 
provides neither notice nor standards for its application such that it is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied.”37 
The opinion then focuses on the fact that the government had argued in its 
brief opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I and II that the 
defendants had in fact actively provided members of IG with communications 
equipment.  This contradicted what the government said in the indictment, 
where it had only charged that Sattar and Stewart had used communications 
equipment.  The court apparently confronted the government with this 
contradiction at oral argument, as the opinion notes that “[t]he Government . . . 
changed course and stated at oral argument that the mere use of one’s 
telephone constitutes criminal behavior under the statute and that, in fact, ‘use 
equals provision.’”38  This 180-degree change in direction prompted the court 
to come to the only reasonable conclusion: If the government itself were 
confused on the theory of its case and how it fit the elements of the statute, 
 
 33. Id. § 2339A(b). 
 34. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 356. 
 35. Id. at 357. 
 36. Id. at 357-58.  The court also referenced a committee report as evidence of the statute’s 
legislative history.  See COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMPREHENSIVE ANTITERRORISM ACT 
OF 1995, H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 45 (1995). 
 37. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 358. 
 38. Id. 
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surely a person of ordinary intelligence would be too; the statute surely was 
vague as applied to the charge. 
Stewart and Sattar argued next that the statute was unconstitutionally 
vague as applied in the context of the “‘provision’ of  ‘personnel.’”39  The case 
indicates that the government relied on United States v. Lindh,40 the so-called 
“American Taliban” case, in which a court stated that the statute covered the 
provision of personnel through one’s own employment by a terrorist 
organization—in other words, that providing oneself to the organization was 
sufficient to constitute providing “personnel.”41  The court in Stewart and 
Sattar’s case asserted that, whatever the merits of such a position in a case like 
Lindh,42 in which the defendant “provides himself” by literally becoming a 
soldier in a terrorist organization’s army,43 this does nothing to overcome the 
unconstitutional vagueness of the “provision of personnel” idea in the statute.  
The court then concluded that to charge that a defendant has provided a foreign 
terrorist organization with herself is particularly troublesome in the context of 
an attorney who represents a terrorist, as Stewart did in her representation of 
Sheikh Adbel Rahman.  Every lawyer is an agent of her client, the court said, 
so under the government’s theory, any lawyer who represents someone 
charged as a leader of a foreign terrorist organization would always be 
providing material support to the terrorist organization.44  Incredibly, just as 
with the discussion of the provision of communications equipment, the 
government was unable to answer the court’s inquiries at oral argument 
concerning its own theories.  The government asserted at oral argument that 
there might be some difference between a member and a “quasi-employee” of 
a foreign terrorist organization for purposes of its “personnel” theory, and the 
court asked the government to explain.  With an abundance of delicacy, the 
court says in its opinion that “the Government initially responded ‘You know it 
when you see it.’”45  Of course, this statement recalls Justice Stewart’s famous 
“method” for identifying obscenity,46 but the court rightly concluded that it is a 
laughable way to explain the application of a powerful federal criminal statute.  
It is, the court says, “an insufficient guide by which a person can predict the 
legality of that person’s conduct.”47  With a bit more discussion, the court 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 41. Id. at 572-73. 
 42. The court doubts the correctness of this idea, noting that it is not supported any place in 
the statute.  Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 360. 
 46. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 47. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 360. 
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dismissed Counts I and II of the indictment against Sattar and Stewart as 
unconstitutionally vague. 
III.  THE LESSONS LEARNED 
The proof of the efficacy of any teaching is what students actually learn 
from it.  In a typical large class, an instructor cannot gauge what everyone in 
the class has picked up from any one session or block of material, at least in 
the absence of an examination question focusing on the particular point.  My 
discussion with students brought out the following overall points in ways that 
were consistent enough that I felt confident that those participating in or 
paying attention to the interchanges would have understood them. 
First, students understood that the first task of any lawyer working in the 
criminal justice process, whether on behalf of the government or the defendant, 
is to familiarize oneself with the elements of the charges.  This process applies 
whether the charges are complex and serious, even newsworthy ones like 
providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, or simple charges 
seen so much more often (such as theft, which appeared in the initial exercises 
I gave the students).  They also saw how important it was to obtain a thorough 
understanding of the elements through the process of statutory interpretation 
and how working with the elements of crimes and using statutory interpretation 
were actually intertwining skills. 
Second, the exercise of using the Sattar case brought home that the things 
we learn in Criminal Law, even very basic skills like understanding what the 
elements of crimes are and how to find, interpret, and use them, are neither 
purely academic matters nor musty ideas from dusty old pages.  They are, 
rather, vital tools in the most important cases in our judicial system right this 
minute.  Likewise, one got the strong sense from the discussion that among the 
students who already found Criminal Law interesting, and perhaps especially 
among those who did not, they developed a much more pointed understanding 
of the vital nature of the material in terms of the most important issues facing 
our society. 
Third, the class discussion revealed feelings of surprise among the students 
that the government seemed to have made some important mistakes in its 
advocacy in the case.  Some students asked whether, in fact, the government’s 
lawyers had indicted the defendants without fully researching or understanding 
what the elements of the crime were, or they asked how the allegations in the 
indictment dovetailed (or rather, did not dovetail) with the elements.  Of 
course, I could not answer those questions because I had no direct knowledge, 
but I had a rather easy time convincing the students of the importance of 
obtaining a strong understanding of the elements of any crime before drafting 
an indictment.  Having to change one’s theory of the case midstream, as they 
saw, was at the least embarrassing, and could even be fatal to the case—an 
outcome any lawyer wants to avoid. 
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Fourth, the students clearly obtained a new understanding of the 
importance of the law, the legal system, and well-honed reasoning and 
lawyering skills in the war on terror.  They also began to understand the fact 
that lawyers—who will inevitably represent those accused of crimes in the war 
against terror—will not only suffer the slings and arrows of public opinion but 
could also find themselves actually accused of cooperating in the worst 
possible crimes against the American people and the United States.  In short, 
the case was a pointed reminder of the stakes in this struggle.  The 
government, students saw, is prepared to do whatever is necessary, even sweep 
attorneys into its net.  I can think of little that could have brought the gravity of 
the situation to my students’ attention so directly—and so personally. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As a teacher with an abiding interest in criminal law and our Constitution, 
and with a deep belief that the stakes for both have never been so high, I plan 
to continue to use whatever I can from the war on terror to illustrate important 
concepts in criminal law.  I have always begun the semester in the class by 
telling my students that it is in criminal law that we can see the most basic, 
naked confrontations between the awesome power of the government and the 
individual.  The war on terror and the changes it continues to bring about in 
our legal system do not change this.  Rather, the war on terror exemplifies and 
magnifies the effect.  I would urge anyone who teaches the subject to explore 
the opportunities for teaching that terrorism cases will bring to a Criminal Law 
class. 
 
